Authentication planning for XOR network coding by Jaffres-Runser, Katia & Lauradoux, Cédric
ar
X
iv
:1
10
3.
17
16
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 9 
M
ar 
20
11
appor t  

de  r ech er ch e 
IS
SN
02
49
-
63
99
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
-
-
75
62
-
-
FR
+
EN
G
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE
Authentication planning for XOR network coding
Katia Jaffrès-Runser — Cédric Lauradoux
N° 7562
March 2011

Centre de recherche INRIA Grenoble – Rhône-Alpes
655, avenue de l’Europe, 38334 Montbonnot Saint Ismier
Téléphone : +33 4 76 61 52 00 — Télécopie +33 4 76 61 52 52
Authentication planning for XOR network coding
Katia Jaffrès-Runser ∗ , Cédric Lauradoux ∗
Thème : Sécurité, Réseau, Codage en réseau
Équipes-Projets SWING
Rapport de recherche n° 7562 — March 2011 — 17 pages
Abstract: This paper formulates the authentication planning problem when
network coding is implemented in a wireless sensor network. The planning
problem aims at minimizing the energy consumed by the security application
which is guarantied using message authentication codes. This paper proposes
a binary non-linear optimization formulation for this planning problem whose
decision variables are the authentication decision of the nodes and the MAC
modes of operation. It is illustrated for a butterfly topology. Results show that
there is a real trade-off between energy efficiency and message throughput in
this context.
Key-words: Wireless sensor networks, network coding, security, message
authentication codes, planning, optimization
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Planification pour la sécurisation d’un codage en
réseau
Résumé : Les réseaux sans-fil sont particulièrement vulnérables aux attaques
par pollution dans lesquelles un attaquant externe est capable d’envoyer ces
propres messages sur le réseau. Pour pouvoir détecter de telles attaques Ĺ la
destination, un code d’authentification (MAC: Message Authentication Code en
anglais) est rajouté Ĺ chaque paquet. Un noeud intermédiaire peut vérifier la
validité d’un paquet de faŊon Ĺ limiter la portée de transmission d’un paquet
pollué dans le réseau. Dans le cadre d’un réseau fortement contraint en énergie
tel qu’un réseau de capteurs, le problème du déploiement d’une stratégie de
sécurisation du réseau par MAC se pose. En effet, la consommation énergétique
du réseau sera fortement influencée d’une part par le type de MAC utilisé dans le
réseau et d’autre part par le choix des relais du réseau qui vérifieront le code des
paquets avant de les retransmettre. Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement
au cas oİ le réseau de capteurs utilise une transmission par codage réseau de
par sa plus grande vulnérabilité aux attaques par pollution. Ce type de réseau
nécessite l’emploi de MAC dédiés (linéaires).
Dans ces travaux, nous proposons une formulation combinatoire du problème
de planification de la sécurité. Dans cette formulation, nous minimisons l’énergie
totale consommée par le réseau sécurisé pour la transmission d’un paquet par
source dans le réseau. Les variables sont les décisions d’authentification binaires
des noeuds. Nous illustrons ce modèle pour un réseau papillon pour lequel
différentes distributions des probabilités d’attaque sur les liens sont considérées.
Mots-clés : Réseaux de capteurs, codage réseau, sécurité, message authenti-
cation codes, planification, optimisation
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1 Introduction
Network coding [1, 2] are particularly vulnerable to pollution attacks [3] where
an outsider adversary injects his malicious data. Indeed, network coding spreads
the pollution by combining legitimate messages with polluted ones and therefore
limiting the recovery probability of legitimate messages. Message authentica-
tion has to be ensured for end-to-end communications between any source and
destination of the network. Pollution attacks can be defeated using message
authentication codes (MACs). The primary goal of MAC is to prevent an ad-
versary to tamper with the messages (substitution) and to forge its own messages
(impersonation). A keyed cryptographic digest of the message, which can be
ciphered or not, is appended to the message. The message is authenticated suc-
cessfully if the destination is able to compute the same keyed signature than the
one appended to the message, knowing the secret key shared with the emitter.
A comprehensive survey of MAC can be found in [4]. In this paper, we make
an extensive use of MAC based on universal hash functions (UHF-MAC) [5].
Such functions may exhibit linearity which is particularly suited for network
coding and they have been used in past works [6–8] to thwart pollution attacks
systematically by each node of the network.
In contrast to previous works [6–8], this paper addresses the problem of ef-
ficiently planning an authentication service for an energy constrained wireless
network. A topical example is wireless sensor networking (WSN) whose security
deployment has to guarantee low energy expenditure [9]. It is used as a case
study herein. The security planning problem resumes to determining which
nodes are going to authenticate the messages and which authentication strate-
gies are the most energy efficient to deploy. We assume that the designer has
some information on the distribution of the threat in the network. For instance,
he may know that part of the network belongs to a trusted perimeter where
security risks are low. Threat is modeled in this work with a probability of
attack for each link of the network. A binary optimization formulation for the
authentication planning problem is derived. Optimal solutions with respect to
energy are provided and analyzed for a butterfly network topology with respect
to various scenarios of attack.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 states the problem and Section
3 derives the according optimization model. Section 4 gives energy optimal roll
out strategies for the butterfly network and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Authentication planning problem
In this paper, we only consider the case of XOR network coding [2] and not
random linear network coding.
2.1 Attack topology
Pollution attacks are committed on the links of the network G. The number
of links attacked and their location define an attack topology A. We consider
that the designer may not have a complete knowledge of the location of the
attack at any point in time. Hence, he may have a confidence level in a link
depending on its location in the network. For instance, links located inside of
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Table 1: Energy performance of basic authentication strategies for a uniform
attack topology.
Security maniac Naïve strategy Authentication planning
Authenticating All relays + Destinations Optimal selection w.r.
Nodes Destinations only threat + destinations
Objective Detect threat asap Limit unnecessary checks Minimize energy
Low threat Energy wasted for Quasi energy
Energy optimal
(small p) unnecessary checks optimal
High threat Quasi energy Energy wasted for
(high p) optimal forwarding polluted messages
a trusted perimeter may have a higher confidence while the ones outside have
a lower confidence. This feature is modeled using a probability of attack pij on
a link (i, j) of the network which is defined as the probability of a message of
being attacked on (i, j).
C
D
(a)
pCD
B
F
A
E
pAC pBC
Figure 1: Butterfly network and attack topology.
An attack topology A is defined by the distribution of the probabilities of
attack for all the links of the network (see Fig. 1). For instance, this topology
can be uniform and in this case, all links are attacked with the same probability
p. Topology A may as well model an attack localized on a single link (i, j). In
this case, A is composed of a single non-null probability of attack pij .
2.2 Authentication strategies
The purpose of this paper is to derive a model that yields the energy optimal
authentication strategy knowing an attack topology A on a network G perform-
ing XOR network coding. An authentication strategy is defined by the subset
of nodes that authenticate the messages and the modes of UHF-MAC used
(presented later in this section).
First of all, it is important to note that the sources generate the messages
with their corresponding digests and that the destinations always verify what
they have received. Consequently, the destinations are always able to disregard
INRIA
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polluted messages. These checks are mandatory and their cost in energy is
incompressible.
For all relaying nodes other than the destinations, we have a degree of free-
dom: they may or not authenticate the messages. This may incur a certain
authentication cost in energy at the relays. As shown in [8] performing verifi-
cation is as energy expensive as sending plus receiving a message. However, in
some cases it may be beneficial to the overall network energy performance since
polluted messages are not uselessly forwarded towards the destination. In the
case of network coding, it will also prevent the creation of polluted combination
and preserve the throughput.
In terms of security planning, two extreme strategies are often considered.
On the one side, the security maniac strategy emphasizes on detecting an attack
as soon as possible, limiting the pollution in the network. All the relaying nodes
authenticate the messages as considered in [3, 6, 7]. Unnecessary verifications
can lead to a waste of energy. On the other side, the security naïve strategy
considers that an end-to-end authentication is sufficient and that there is no
need to empower relays with authentication capabilities. Forwarding polluted
messages incurs both a same energy waste and a throughput reduction.
Intermediate strategies are possible to improve the energy and throughput
performance. Table 4 resumes all strategies. Finding optimal strategies is the
aim of this work which can be achieved by solving an optimization problem.
More specifically, we define the authentication planning problem that minimizes
the overall energy consumption of a WSN knowing its topology, the network
coding rules, the authentication MAC modes and the attack topology existing
in the network.
2.3 MAC schemes
It has been established by Apavatjrut et al. in [8] that MACs based on the
classical primitives that are block ciphers or hash functions imply an energetic
cost too important for the relaying nodes of a WSN. The same observation holds
for the underlying primitives (exponentiation) used in [7]. On the opposite,
MACs based on UHFs [6, 8] offer more flexibility for the authentication if we
use an ǫ-almost XOR universal hash (ǫ-AXU) function h is (see [5] for more
details). The most interesting property for our problem is the linearity of these
functions: h(m1)⊕ h(m2) = h(m1 ⊕m2) with m1 and m2 two n-bit messages.
We voluntarily skip the details related to this function as they are not essential
to understand the core of this paper (see [6, 8] for further details).
Exploiting the linearity is particularly interesting for authentication in the
context of network coding. Let us consider a node in the network who has to
combine (XOR) ℓ messages and their corresponding authentication codes. A
MAC based on ǫ-AXU function offers three possibilities for authentication: (i)
the node authenticates each message individually, combines (XOR) the valid
ones and computes the authentication code of this sum. Then, the message is
forwarded. We refer to this mode of operation by AXF throughout the paper.
The AXF mode requires ℓ verifications, i.e. ℓ computations of the MAC. (ii)
The node checks that the sum modulo two of the authentication codes is equal
to the authentication codes of the sum modulo two of the messages. By doing
so, it exploits the linearity of the MAC to reduce the authentication to a single
computation of the MAC. We refer to this mode of operation as XAF. The
RR n° 7562
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drawback of the XAF is that the node forwards a message if and only if the ℓ
incoming messages are not polluted. (iii) The node can also simply forward the
sum modulo two of messages alongside the sum modulo two of the authentication
codes. Any verification is delegated to other nodes. We refer to this mode of
operation as XF.
3 Optimization model
The authentication planning problem is formulated in the following using a
binary integer program.
3.1 Network model
We assume that the network topology is known. The network is modeled using
a directed acyclic graph G(V , E) having vertex set V and edge set E ⊂ V × V .
Without loss of generality, V = {1, 2, . . . , |V|}. For each node i ∈ V ,
−→
Ni and
←−
Ni
are the sets of edges leaving from and the set of edges going into i, respectively.
Formally
−→
Ni = {(i, j)|(i, j) ∈ E} and
←−
Ni = {(j′, i)|(j′, i) ∈ E}.
A set of sources O and destinations D is defined. Since we address the WSN
case, O is the set of sensors having data to report in multicast to the |D| sink
nodes and we consider |D| << |O|. Source and destination nodes do not relay
the information. As a consequence, the network we are modeling is composed
of a set of relay nodes R = V \ (O ∪ D). In the following, we consider that the
number of relays in the network is N = |R|. So far, we do not consider any
propagation losses and assume a perfect channel transmission.
The vertices V are partitioned into two groups of nodes: a subset Rc ∈ R
of relays performing XOR network coding and Rf = R \ Rc which are simply
forwarding messages. Knowing G(V , E), simple rules are set to define Rc and
Rf : the coding relays have more than one edge coming into them (i.e. |
←−
Ni| > 1)
while forwarding-only relaysRf are characterized by a single incoming edge (i.e.
|
←−
Ni| = 1).
The binary quantity ci ∈ {0, 1} is fixed to differentiate nodes of Rc per-
forming network coding from nodes of Rf that are simply forwarding messages.
Hence, for any node i ∈ Rc, ci = 1 and for i ∈ Rf , ci = 0.
Attack topology Security threats are modeled in G by a valuation pij on
edge (i, j) ∈ E . The set of all valuations A = {pij |(i, j) ∈ E} defines an attack
topology. We assume that the attacks are independent on the edges of the graph.
The attack topology is considered as being known by the network designer. In
this setup, energy optimal security strategies can be derived as shown in the
following.
The following optimization model captures the impact of the previously de-
scribed MAC strategies on the overall energy consumption of the network.
3.2 Optimization variables
Authenticate variable Any node in R may or may not authenticate mes-
sages, whether this node is a coding or a forwarding-only node. Let xi ∈ {0, 1}
INRIA
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be the first main binary variable of this model. If xi = 1, node i authenticates
each incoming message while if xi = 0, it never authenticates.
If a node authenticates a message (i.e. xi = 1), it has two opposite effects
on the overall energy consumption:
• more energy is spent by the authentication process,
• but energy for forwarding polluted messages is saved.
MAC mode of operation As shown earlier, XAF and AXF modes do not
yield the same energy consumption. Let mi ∈ {0, 1} be a binary variable that
gives the mode of authentication used by a coding node i ∈ Rc. If mi = 1,
we have XAF and if mi = 0 we have AXF. This variable can be interpreted
as whether the XOR operation is done before authentication (mi = 1 ; XAF
mode) or after authentication (mi = 0 ; AXF mode).
Node and network authentication strategy The node authentication strat-
egy Si is defined for any coding node i ∈ Rc by the tuple Si = (xi,mi, ci) and
for any forwarding-only node i ∈ Rf by the pair Si = (xi, ci). Table 2 gives the
correspondence between the possible tuples and the MAC modes of operation
for any coding and forwarding-only node. For forwarding-only nodes, the value
of mi is undetermined since no XOR step is performed.
The network authentication strategy ξ is defined by the set of node authen-
tication strategies for all nodes of the network ξ = {Si, ∀i ∈ R}.
Table 2: MAC modes and corresponding security strategies
Node security strategies
Coding node
AXF (xi = 1, mi = 0, ci = 1)
XAF (xi = 1, mi = 1, ci = 1)
XF (xi = 0, mi = 1, ci = 1)
Relay node
AF (xi = 1, ci = 0)
F (xi = 0, ci = 0)
3.3 Forwarding decisions
We define the forwarding decision of a node i as the probability that this node
decides to transmit a received message. Let fi ∈ [0, 1] be the forwarding proba-
bility of node i. If authentication is performed by node i, this decision is positive
if no polluted message is detected. This decision is a direct consequence of the
node authentication strategy Si (xi, mi) and the probability of a polluted mes-
sage to arrive from a direct neighbor node k to node i.
Let define Pki as the probability of a polluted message to arrive at node
i coming from node k. This probability is a function of node authentication
strategy Sk, the forwarding decisions and the attack probabilities related to all
the paths between the sources s ∈ O and i going through k. Its derivation is
given after the forwarding decision description.
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The forwarding decision fi of node i depends on its node type ci. The global
formulation of fi is:
fi = (1− ci) · f
R
i + ci · f
C
i (1)
where fRi and f
C
i are the forwarding probabilities for the case node i is a for-
warding or a coding node, respectively.
Forwarding node For i ∈ Rf (ci = 0), the forwarding decision is function
of xi and Pki. If ai = 0, the node simply forwards every received message and
hence fi = 1. Else (xi = 1) the node forwards with probability fi = (1 − Pki)
which represents the probability of an unpolluted message to arrive in i. The
forwarding probability for the case ci = 0 is derived as:
fRi = (1− xi) + xi(1−Pki) (2)
Coding node For i ∈ Rc (ci = 1), the forwarding decision depends on the
MAC strategy. For the case of AXF, a node forwards a message if at least
one of its incoming messages is non-polluted which happens with probability
1−
∏
k∈
←−
Ni
Pki. For the case of XAF, a message is forwarded if all messages XOR-
ed together are non-polluted which happens with probability
∏
k∈
←−
Ni
(1−Pki)
A closed-form derivation of the forwarding decision for any type of node of
the network is given by:
fCi = (1− xi)+
xi

mi · ∏
k∈
←−
Ni
(1 −Pki) + (1−mi)(1−
∏
k∈
←−
Ni
Pki)

 (3)
The pollution probability Pki A message coming into node i from a neigh-
bor node can be polluted for two reasons: i) node k sends a message that is not
polluted and the message gets polluted on the link between k and i following
the local probability of attack pki on (k, i) ; ii) node k forwards a message that
is polluted (this is only the case if node k does not implement an authentication
function, i.e. xk = 0).
For the case xk = 1, node k authenticates and the pollution probability
is equal to Pki = fk · pki, which is the probability that node k forwards an
unpolluted message and that it can only be polluted by an attack on link (k, i).
For the case xk = 0, node k cannot detect if it forwards a polluted message
or not. Hence, the probability for the message sent by k to be polluted depends
on the previous history of the message in the network. Hence, it is derived
recursively knowing the values of the forwarding and attack probabilities on all
paths coming into node k. In this case, Pki = 1 − (1 − pki) ·
∏
l∈
←−
Nk
(1 − Plk),
where
∏
l∈
←−
Nk
(1 − Plk) is the probability for a message to arrive in k without
being polluted on the links coming into k.
A global formulation of Pki with respect to xk is given by:
Pki = fk [xk · pki +
(1− xk) ·

1− (1 − pki) · ∏
l∈
←−
Nk
(1−Plk)



 (4)
INRIA
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For the case k = s ∈ O, Psi = psi since fs = 1.
Pollution and forwarding probability Since the network is a directed
acyclic graph, there are no loops in the network and the values of the pollu-
tion and forwarding probabilities exist and can be derived for any node of the
network. The causal dependency between the definitions of these probabilities
is rooted in the network coding of the messages originating from different paths.
In order to compute fi for node i, the pollution probabilities on all its incoming
links {Pki, ∀k ∈
←−
Ni} are needed. These values depend on the forwarding prob-
abilities of the intermediary nodes that belong to the existing paths joining the
source nodes to i.
We consider first the case of a layered network where the network is divided
into layers of nodes. The sources are connected to nodes of layer one but not
to nodes of layer 2, nodes of layer 1 are connected to nodes of layer 2 but not
to nodes of layer 3, etc. In this case, pollution and forwarding probabilities can
be computed layer by layer. For layer 1 nodes, Psi = psi and fi is deduced
using (1). Then, Pij is computed according to (4) for layer 2 nodes and fj is
derived according to (1) for layer 2 nodes as well. The process is repeated until
the destination layer is reached. This iterative algorithm can be extended to
support the case of a more general DAG, but for conciseness purposes, it is not
presented herein.
3.4 Energy cost function
The energy cost function FE(ξ) counts the energy spent for the end-to-end
transmission of one message sent by the sources s ∈ O to their destinations Ds
for a specific network authentication strategy (or solution) ξ:
FE(ξ) = FO(ξ) + FR(ξ) + FD(ξ) (5)
where FO(ξ), FR(ξ) and FD(ξ) are the costs in energy relative to the energy
expenditure of source nodes, relay nodes and destination nodes, respectively.
Table 3: Energy costs (×10−4J) for the atomic actions. Values are given for
the transmission of one message.
Emission QT 0.556851
Reception QR 0.7995405
Authentication (UHF-MAC) QA 1.686154
XOR of 2 messages QXOR 0.00003135
The costs in energy for the atomic actions are listed in Table 3. They have
been collected in [8] using the WSim/eSimu energy estimation tool [10] for a
TI MSP430 based platform and a Ti CC2420, 802.15.4 compliant, radio device
similar to TelosB nodes. It is worth mentioning that one authentication is as
expensive as a combined message emission and reception.
The cost related to the transmission of a message by the source nodes is
directly proportional to the number of sources FO = |O| · (QT + QA). The
cost related to the reception of a message by the destination nodes depends
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on the number of messages Nd destination d will receive from its previous hop
neighbors:
FD =
∑
d∈D
Nd · (QR +QA)
where Ni =
∑
k∈
←−
Ni
fk.
The derivation of the energy consumption for all relays in the network is
given by:
FR =
∑
i∈R
[Ni ·QR + xi · FA(ci,mi) + fi ·QT ]
The function FA(ci,mi) gives the energy consumption of authentication with re-
spect to the type of node (coding or forwarding) and the MAC mode considered.
It is defined by:
FA(ci,mi) = ci · [QXOR · (Ni − 1)+
mi ·QXAF (i) + (1 −mi) ·QAXF (i)] + (1− ci)QA ·P
Rec
i
where QAXF (i) and QXAF (i) are the costs for authenticating a message using
AXF and XAF, respectively. PReci = 1 −
∏
k∈
←−
Ni
(1 − fk) is the probability of
node i to receive at least one message from its one hop neighbors.
XAF has the cost of authenticating a single message (QXAF (i) = QA ·PReci )
since it is performed on the XOR-ed version of the incoming messages. QAXF (i)
is a function of the number of messages received at node i since each incoming
message is authenticated individually. It is derived as QAXF (i) = QA ·Ni
3.5 Optimization problem definition
We recall that R is a set of N relays of c = |Rc| coding and N − c forwarding
relays. The security planning problem can be formulated by the binary integer
program as follows.
INRIA
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min FE(ξ)
s.t. fi = (1− ci) · f
R
i + ci · f
C
i , ∀i ∈ R
fRi = (1− xi) + xi(1−Pki), ∀i ∈ Rf
fCi = (1− xi) + xi

mi · ∏
k∈
←−
Ni
(1−Pki) +
(1−mi)(1 −
∏
k∈
←−
Ni
Pki)

 , ∀i ∈ Rc
Pki = fk [xk · pki +
(1− xk) ·

1− (1− pki) · ∏
l∈
←−
Nk
(1 −Plk)




ξ = {Si, ∀i ∈ R}
Si =
{
(xi,mi, ci) ∀i ∈ Rc
(xi, ci) ∀i ∈ Rf
(ci, xi) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} ∀i ∈ R
mi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ Rc
pki ∈ [0, 1] ∀(i, j) ∈ E
The solution set has a cardinality of 3c ·2N−c. The energy cost is not linear and
hence, the problem is not an binary linear program.
Table 4: Description of the six solutions for the butterfly network
Strategy (xC ,mC) xD Description
(XF ; F) (0,−) 0 C, D forward only
(XF ; AF) (0,−) 1 Authentication on D only
(AXF ; F) (1, 0) 0 AXF on C only
(XAF ; F) (1, 1) 0 XAF on C only
(AXF ; AF) (1, 0) 1 AXF on C, Auth. on D only
(XAF ; F) (1, 1) 1 XAF on C, Auth. on D
4 Results
The security planning problem is illustrated for the butterfly network (cf. Fig. 1).
C is a coding node and D a forwarding relay. The six network authentication
strategies are given in Table 4. For instance, the first strategy (XF ; F) is the
security naïve strategy where neither C nor D are authenticating. On the op-
posite, the two last entries are security maniac strategies where both nodes are
authenticating.
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Figure 2: Energy optimal strategy with and without best throughput constraint
with respect to attack probability p when 1, 2 and 3 links are attacked.
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Figure 3: Average probability to receive non-polluted messages for energy op-
timal strategies with and without best throughput constraint with respect to
attack probability p when 1, 2 and 3 links are attacked.
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In this analysis, we only consider attack topologies that involve the links
(A,C), (B,C) and (C,D) since attacks on other links can only be detected by
destinations E and F . We describe three scenarios of attack:
• The attack targets a single link. Since the network is symmetrical, only
the cases of an attack on links (A,C) and (C,D) are relevant. We chose
to show the results for an attack on link (A,C).
• The attack targets two links. Again, only the cases where attacks are on
the pair of links (A,C)/(B,C) and (A,C)/(C,D) can be considered for
symmetry purposes. The results related to the (A,C)/(C,D) pairs are
presented here. We assume that the attacks on both links arise with the
same probability (i.e. pAC = pCD = p).
• The attack targets the incoming links of the relaying nodes. In this case,
all three links are attacked with the same uniform probability (i.e. pAC =
pBC = pCD = p).
The results related to the energy optimal strategies are given on Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3. Fig. 2 presents the total energy spent FE(ξ∗) by the optimal strategy ξ∗
with respect to the attack probability p on the link(s) targeted by the attacker.
Two cases are considered. In the first one, we look for the energy optimal strategy
which minimizes total energy following the problem defined in Section 3. In the
second case, we show the performance of the energy optimal with best throughput
strategy which looks for the strategy that maximizes the throughput at minimal
energy.
Throughput is measured in our case by the average probability Pth for both
destinations E and F to decode the messages of A and B. Destinations can
decode messages from A and B if they are non-polluted. If authentication is
performed at coding node C, this probability depends on the MAC mode. For
AXF, this probability is higher than for XAF because messages that are not
polluted are always forwarded. A general expression for the butterfly network
is Pth = 0.5 · fc · (1− pCD) [2− pAC − pBC ], where fC = 1− pAC · pBC for AXF
and fC = (1 − pAC)(1 − pBC). Fig. 3 gives the values of Pth with respect to
the attack probability p for the energy optimal and energy optimal with best
throughput strategies.
Results show that strategies that minimize the number of forwarded mes-
sages are the most energy efficient ones. AXF never belongs to an energy optimal
strategy because the energy cost of verification is high but also because it trans-
mits more messages. However, this is the only MAC mode that mitigates the
spread of pollution induced by network coding. As a first conclusion, if through-
put guarantee is the main concern, energy has to be spent for authentication by
using AXF.
When the probability of attack is low, the strategy where C and D simply
forward messages is the most energy efficient since there are no security checks.
However, when p increases, more energy can be saved by authenticating mes-
sages at the relays. For instance, for a single attack on (A,C) and p > 0.24,
strategy (XAF;F) saves more energy because D does not relay combined mes-
sages that are polluted. For high p, XAF mode on C provides the minimum
energy but drastically reduces throughput. Consequently, for small p, the energy
optimal strategy is to be favored because the loss of throughput is less important
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while for higher p, more energy-consuming modes of MAC have to be considered
to favor throughput.
5 Conclusions and Perspectives
This paper formulates the energy efficient authentication planning problem for
XOR network coding. It formulates the problem as a binary non-linear opti-
mization problem that minimizes the overall energy consumption of the secured
network. Optimal roll-out of security-enabled nodes can be deduced together
with their appropriate MAC mode. Results for the butterfly topology exhibit
the trade-off between energy efficiency and throughput of non-polluted messages
as a function of the MAC mode considered.
Determining optimal security roll-outs should now be done for larger net-
works. In this context, exhaustive search is not scalable and proper optimization
tools need to be derived in future works. A relaxed version of the problem can
be formulated where the binary authentication variable becomes a message au-
thentication probability. In this case, we move from a hard decision to a soft
decision model, which could be easier to solve. A multiobjective optimization
approach could be considered as well in order to find the Pareto bound maximiz-
ing network throughput and minimizing energy expenditure. This work opens
several perspectives as well. Extending this study to the case of random linear
network coding is important for future work. Similarly, the definition of dis-
tributed algorithms that converge to energy efficient authentication strategies
is a practical result of interest.
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